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extent did the jihad reflect, instead, a battle among Muslims over the nature of Islamic government and
society? How did Muslim religious sensibilities influence popular responses to British colonialism after
1898? To what extent did jihadist discourses persist among Sudanese Muslims, both in the AngloEgyptian period and in the decades following decolonization? Reciprocally, to what extent were British
policies anti-Muslim? How did British fears of Muslim “fanaticism” influence colonial policies on
education, administration, and public health, and did these policies amount to a series of “colonial
crusades”?
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Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from
1881 to the Present
HEATHER]. SHARKEY

The first jihad of modern Sudanese history began in 1881, when a northern Sudanese Muslim scholar named Muhammad Ahmad (1844-1885) declared himself to
be al-Mahdi-"t he Rightly Guided One"-who would restore justice in an age of
chaos before the Day of Judgment. Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, then declared
jihad against the Turco-Egyptian regime that had been ruling the region since
Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, had ordered a conquest in
1820. 1 Tapping into popular Muslim millenarian beliefs and into widespread
grievances against this regime, the Mahdi amassed followers, who defeated TurcoEgyptian forces in a series of battles. The regime collapsed in 1885, when Mahdist
armies overtook the colonial capital, Khartoum, and killed Charles Gordon, the
British military careerist and devout Christian whom authorities had appointed
as governor-gen eral. Gordon's death, in turn, galvanized evangelical Christians in
Britain and helped to fuel a burgeoning movement among Protestant missionaries who were adopting the militant rhetoric of the British government in its age
of "New Imperialism.'' 2 Some of these missionaries indeed described their evangelism as a modern crusade. 3
The Mahdi died from a sudden illness shortly after the fall of Khartoum in 1885,
so the task of organizing the Mahdist state fell to his successor, known as al-Khalifa
Abdullahi (r. 1885-1898) or simply the Khalifa. 4 Meanwhile, British authorities
eyed Sudan from the distance of Egypt, which Britain had occupied in 1882.
Drawing on British popular support for retaliation against the Mahdists and
responding to the "Scramble for Africa," Britain launched a "Reconquest" of Sudan
in 1898 while using new technologies such as railways and Maxim guns to crush
Mahdist armies. After contriving a government known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (which reflected an ostensible partnership with Egypt), Britain went on
to rule Sudan until1956. Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian period, British fears of
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Muslim "fanaticism" influenced colonial policies toward education, administration,
and public health, while arguably also shaping assumptions about Islam among
members of the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) missions that streamed into
the country on the heels of the colonial conquest.
At decolonization in the mid-1950s, Britain passed control of Sudan-by then
consisting of a territory far larger and more culturally diverse than anything the
Turco-Egyptians or Mahdists had ruled-to a small group of highly educated and
socially elite Muslim Arabic-speaking nationalists, many of whom were sons and
grandsons of the Mahdi's supporters. In 1955 (just months before formal independence), concerns about the transfer of power set off a conflict that many historians retrospectively called the "first civil war" (1955-1972), in relation to what
became known as the "second civil war" (1983-c. 2005). Meanwhile, in 1958, following a brief period of parliamentary rule in which factions followed Muslim
sectarian lines, a military junta seized power in a coup d'etat. Military-backed
regimes went on to rule Sudan for most of the half-century that followed. At the
same time, postcolonial conflicts variously simmered and boiled, with "rebels" in
Sudan's southern, western, and eastern peripheries resisting the policies of the
Khartoum regimes. So complex, long-running, and geographically diffuse were
Sudan's civil conflicts that one historian later argued convincingly for a plurality
of Sudanese "civil wars." 5
Sudan's civil conflicts have been complex and multifaceted. Yet in the postcolonial period, foreign media often portrayed them simplistically, as a single war
between a Muslim Arab North and a Christian African South. This portrayal was
misleading insofar as it emphasized a kind of religious and ethnic or racial antipathy while minimizing the battles over power and resources that lay at the root of
the conflict. Meanwhile, jihadist rhetoric periodically surfaced amid the fighting.
Successive regimes in Khartoum, though most notably the ideologically Islamist
regime of 'Umar al-Bashir (r. 1989-present), invoked jihadist discourses to justify
central-government attacks on dissidents in the country's peripheries.
If one thing stands out from this history, it is that jihads and crusades have
been self-constitutive acts. 6 They have been more about affirming or defining the
self than about striking at enemies. They have entailed assertions of power and
sometimes calls for change, both between and within religious communities. Neither Muslims and Christians within Sudan nor observers outside the country appear to have appreciated fully these aspects of the "holy" wars of modern Sudan.

Jihad! Anti-Christian Sentiment1
and the Mahdist Revolution
Contrary to the insinuations oflate-Victorian-era British writers, the anti-Christian
dimension of the Mahdist jihad was minimal. When Na'um Shuqayr, a Syro-Lebanese official in the Intelligence Department of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, published
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Jughra{iyya wa tarikh al-Sudan (an Arabic survey of Sudanese history, culture, and
geography) in 1903, he listed the factors that had inspired the Mahdist movement
and its call to arms. Above all, Sudanese Muslims resented the Turco-Egyptian
regime's oppressive and mounting taxation, its efforts to restrict the slave trade
(which Sudanese Muslims regarded as part of the Islamic social order and on which
many relied for agricultural labor), its crushing of early dissidents, and its favoritism
toward particular groups. 7 Economic distress among small-scale farmers and traders,
along with dislocations caused by government monopoly systems and the introduction of cash currencies, also contributed to dissatisfaction. 8 Still others objected to
what they perceived as the irreligiosity and debauchery of Turco-Egyptian (Muslim)
administrators. For example, one writer claimed in 1901, twenty years after the
start of the Mahdist revolution, that "Muhammad Ahmad [al-Mahdi] was among
the group of religious notables in al-Obeid who were outraged by a marriage ceremony between a man and a young boy, but when they protested to the local Egyptian
official they received insulting treatment." 9
It made matters worse, in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims, that in the 1870s, the
Turco-Egyptian administration had begun appointing European Christian (and
Jewish) 10 officers to positions of importance.U This policy marked a sharp departure from conventions of Islamic statecraft, which had barred Christians and
Jews from bearing arms in Muslim societies.U The Turco-Egyptians appointed
men such as the Briton Charles Gordon, first as governor of Equatoria province
and later as governor-general of the whole territoryY In Equatoria alone, Gordon's staff included "two Americans, an Italian, a Frenchman, and three (later
five) Englishmen." 14 Elsewhere in Sudan, the Turco-Egyptians appointed several
Americans who had fought for Confederate forces during the American Civil War
and who found themselves unemployed afterwardY Sudanese Muslims regarded
these appointments as further evidence of the mismanagement of the TurcoEgyptian regime.
There is no evidence that the Mahdi had grievances about Charles Gordon in
particular or that he even knew much about him. And in fact, Gordon appears to
have done a good job as a Sudan administrator. According to one historian, when
Gordon was serving as the Turco-Egyptian governor-general from 1877 to 1880,
he reversed long-standing Turco-Egyptian policies that had marginalized Sudanese Sufi leaders, adopted a more tolerant attitude toward Sudanese Islam, and
included more Sudanese Muslims in his administration. Symbolically, in an effort
to make the Turco-Egyptian government more responsive, Gordon even affixed a
suggestion and complaint box to the gates of his palace in Khartoum so that the
people could express their concerns. 16
Nevertheless, the appearance of non-Muslims in the Turco-Egyptian regime
during the 1870s disturbed Sudanese Muslims insofar as through these men, the
acceleration of Western imperialism was becoming visible. By the time Muhammad Ahmad declared himself Mahdi in 1881, fifty-one years had passed since the
French invasion and conquest of Algeria, while just six years had passed since an
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Anglo-French banking consortium had seized control of Ottoman and Egyptian
finances and public debts. A mere four years had passed since Queen Victoria had
declared herself empress of India. Meanwhile, Britain was intent on safeguarding
the Suez Canal (opened to traffic in 1869) along with maritime routes to India.
European powers were calling the Ottoman empire "the Sick Man of Europe," and
the empire was certainly struggling to hold on to its fringes: Greece had been
independent since the 1820s, while other Christian populations (such as the
Armenians) were becoming more restive. Disquieting news from Muslim traders
and pilgrims crossing the Sahara, traversing the Nile Valley or the Red Sea corridor, and returning from Mecca contributed to the flow of information into
Sudan on all of these aspects of European expansion. Such news added to the
sense of anxiety and malaise that made Sudan a ripe field for millenarianismP
Even the war that the Mahdists began with Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia) does
not support the idea that the Mahdist jihad was explicitly anti-Christian. To be
sure, in 1889, when the Mahdists fired a volley that killed Yohannes IV, the Abyssinian emperor, on the battlefield, the Khalifa Abdullahi hailed the emperor's
death as a great victory for Islam against Christianity. Yet the Mahdist victory
against Abyssinia had practical purposes that transcended ideology: it drew more
firmly what had been until then a shaky Sudanese-Ethiopian border while maintaining commercial exchanges and did so at a time when the Mahdists were trying
to assert the bounds of their territory vis-a-vis "Muslim" Egypt. 18 Indeed, the
Mahdists called all of their opponents infidels (kuffar), both Muslims (such as the
Turco-Egyptian authorities) and Christians. Invoking jihad against "infidels" justified the seizure of booty and helped to build up the Mahdist treasury at a time
when the Mahdist state was increasingly isolated, restricted in trade, and desperate for income. 19
Watching from the distance of Mecca as the Mahdist revolution unfolded, a
Shafi'i Muslim scholar named Ahmad Zayni Dahlan (d. 1886)-a man who was
neither Sudanese nor a believer in the Mahdi-voiced support for its battles. DabIan expressed hope that the Mahdi and his supporters would strike Western,
Christian forces that were beginning to exert themselves in the region and thereby
help to bolster the Ottoman empire. But Dahlan was misinformed about the
movement. 20 Opposition to an incipient Western imperialism was one source of
Mahdist activism but only one: at least in the early years of the movement (188185), opposition to Turco-Egyptian imperialism was far more important in triggering and sustaining jihad.

The Nature, Goals, and Impact of the MahdistJihad
The overarching goal of the Mahdist movement was to reform Islam from within,
by purging popular customs and practices deemed "un-Islamic," and to establish
an Islamic government. In this regard, the Sudanese Mahdist movement belonged
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to a series of reformist jihad movements that swept through Islamic Africa during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 21 Like the earlier jihads of 'Uthman
dan Fodio and 'Umar Tall in West Africa (discussed by David Robinson in chapter
12 above), the Mahdi's jihad largely entailed a battle among Muslims over the direction that Muslim culture and statecraft should take. It also had a strong nativist dimension, insofar as it emphasized the primacy of local Muslim rule.
Sudanese Islam had been evolving for centuries and, like religious cultures
everywhere, was a work in progress. Arab Muslim conquerors had reached Nubia,
roughly along the present-day Sudanese-Egyptian border, as early as 651-the
same year when Arab Muslim armies overthrew the last Sassanian shah of Iran.
But compared with Islam in Iran, Islam in Sudan took centuries longer to spread.
Christianity persisted in Nubia until the early fourteenth century, that is, until
22
around 1315, when the first Muslim seized the Nubian throne. Two centuries
later, around 1500, a Muslim sultanate known as the Funj emerged near the
junction of the White and Blue Niles, followed shortly thereafter, around 1600, by
another sultanate, led by the Kayra dynasty, in Darfur to the west. The emergence
of these two Mus lim states helped to foster what historians have described as the
consolidation of Sudanese Muslim culture. During the Funj era, this Muslim culture centered on Sufi holy men, who often functiol).ed as amulet writers, healers,
fortune-tellers, and even rainmakers. 23 The Funj and Kayra sultanates also provided the kind of political stability that enabled new Muslim pilgrimage and trade
routes to flourish. Instead of crossing the Sahara to North Africa's Mediterranean
coast and from there heading by sea to Arabia, West African pilgrims began taking
a route across the interior Sudanic belt of Africa, which brought them past Lake
Chad through Sudan to its Red Sea port at Suakin, which was just two hundred
miles from Jiddah. 24 Indeed, West African pilgrims from the Sokoto caliphate
probably transmitted the millenarian ideas and Mahdist expectations that caught
on in Sudan. 25
The reforms that developed out of the Mahdist jihad emphasized the more rigorous implementation of Islamic law, practice, and administration. Important evidence for this change appears in the proclamations (manshurat), fatwas, letters,
and warnings (indharat) that the Mahdi (and to some extent the Khalifa) issued in
writing. The Mahdi and Khalifa used these texts to justify their leadership, announce appointments, or make stipulations for the functioning of the military,
treasury, and other branches of government. Several of the Mahdi's proclamations also set social guidelines. For example, he issued orders about marriage and
divorce (including limits on dowries and bride wealth), musical performance (for
example, by forbidding the use of certain instruments but allowing, within limits,
the use of copper drums), and social infractions (by specifying punishments for
offenses as minor as swearing, for example, by calling a fellow Muslim believer
[akh mu'min] a "dog," a "pig," or a "Jew," with the first two of these slurs also connoting a Jew or a Christian). 26 Given the Mahdist state's attempts to pronounce
and enforce matters of Islamic law governing the details of everyday life, it is no
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accident that some observers of contemporary Sudan have drawn parallels
between the Mahdist state and Sudan's post-1989 regime, the government of
General BashirY The latter touted its Muslim credentials and commitment to
Islamic law, while enforcing rules on mundane behavior, for example, by forbidding women from wearing trousers and requiring them to wear a particular style
of hijab that covered more hair than the sari-like tobe (thawb) had conventionally
done. 28
The Mahdist jihad also entailed an internal war for Muslim authority and leadership and posed a direct threat to local Sufi orders (tariqas) that had developed
clear structures of power. 29 Thus, the staunchest opponents of the Mahdi were the
Sudanese Muslim Sufi leaders, who refused to offer fealty (bay'a). Among these
were members of the Mirghani family, leaders of the Khatmiyya Sufi tariqa, who
had close ties to Egypt and the Hijaz and who were interested in the kind of Muslim reform that some scholars have described as "neo-Sufism." 30
Tribal and regional differences, along with economic rivalries, also came into
play, complicating the Mahdist movement's internal politics. Divisions were visible within the ranks of Mahdist supporters, notably between the awlad al-balad
families of the riverine north (some of whom were relatives of the Mahdi) and the
Baqqara Arab nomads of western Sudan (some of whom were relatives of the
Khalifa). The Mahdi and the Khalifa pursued two strategies to curb their enemies
and to stifle dissent. First, the Mahdi declared Sufi tariqas null and void (though
this had limited effect, and indeed Sufi organizations persisted and later
rebounded). The Mahdi also established specific rituals for devotion, notably by
promoting an authoritative prayer book (ratib), that made Mahdist practice somewhat distinct from other Sufi tariqas. 31 Second, the Khalifa tried to erase tribal
differences through policies of forced migration (tahjir), urban resettlement (in
the new capital, Omdurman), and intermarriage. 32
In the late twentieth century, Sudanese historians were still debating the success of the latter policies. Some argued that the Khalifa's policies successfully generated unity through amalgamation and muted tribal consciousness. Others
maintained that his policies left Sudanese Muslim communities more divided and
more mutually hostile than ever and that they helped to foster a culture of Muslim sectarianism. 33 Certainly, the Khalifa's occasional use of brutal collective punishments signaled his own continuing recognition of clans and tribes, rather than
individuals, as social units.31
In an age when literacy rates were minimal and when movable-type printing
and railways had not yet reached the country, how did the Mahdi and the Khalifa
spread their messages of jihad and reform at the grassroots to rally popular support?35 It appears that panegyric poetry, recited and sung, was the Mahdist movement's mass medium. 36 The Mahdi and the Khalifa sponsored panegyrists, and
while a few wrote their compositions down, most appear to have recorded them in
their own heads. 37 Some of these praise poets passed their Mahdist compositions
down to sons and grandsons, whose continuing commitment to Mahdist faith
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arguably represented its own form of Sufi "tariqa loyalty." 38 In the mid-twentieth
century, a Sudanese scholar named Qurashi Muhammad Hasan interviewed the
grandsons of Mahdist praise poets and recorded their compositions. Qurashi
Muhammad Hasan later suggested that Mahdist praise poetry in the 1880s had
entailed a "jihad of the pen" and that it had been just as important as the "jihad of
the sword" in accomplishing revolution. 39 He recognized, in other words, that the
Mahdist jihad had had a strong rhetorical dimension.

After Jihad: The British in Sudan
In 1898, a joint British-Egyptian army overthrew the Mahdist state. At the battle
of Karari just outside Omdurman, eleven thousand Sudanese Mahdist soldiers
died, and sixteen thousand were wounded, compared with just 49 dead and 382
wounded among the Anglo-Egyptian forces. In The River War, Winston Churchill,
who had been a young war correspondent covering the invasion, noted the technological supremacy of British weapons and called the battle of Karari "the most
10
signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians."· However, it
took nearly a year for Anglo-Egyptian soldiers to catch up with the Khalifa Abdullahi, who had retreated. Later, British sources publicized a photograph of his
corpse, which was splayed on the prayer mat where soldiers had killed himY In
1932, one writer called the Khalifa's death "the end of Mahdism," but history was
already proving that claim wrong. After 1898, Mahdist faith persisted among
humble families that had supported the movement, while in the years following
World War I, some sons and grandsons of the Mahdist elite came to lead a mainstream political movement that sought to negotiate Sudanese independence from
Britain and Egypt. Often called neo-Mahdism, this twentieth-century movement
became a central player in Anglo-Egyptian-era nationalist activities and in postcolonial Sudanese politics.
Initially, after 1898, British authorities pursued a strategy of quarantine vis-avis the surviving family members of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, and their emirs
(leading military commanders). They exiled many sons of these Mahdist elites
into a kind of prison-cum-house arrest in Egypt and kept the two surviving sons
of the Mahdi under close watch in Khartoum. 42 But within a few years, they were
revising their policy, by providing the sons of Mahdist elites (including sons of the
Khalifa) with modern educations and hiring them into the Anglo-Egyptian colonial bureaucracy as agricultural inspectors, civil engineers, district officials, and
the like. The policy of co-opting elites had already served Britain well in India, and
it became highly effective in Sudan, too. 43
The greatest fear of British officials in Sudan was that they might do something
to stimulate Muslim "fanaticism" and to provoke a new jihad. So they took special
pains to cultivate Muslim elites, particularly those, such as members of the
Mirghani family, that had resisted the Mahdist movement. Meanwhile, British
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authorities set out to cultivate a new quiescent class of ulema who could keep a
system of Islamic law courts running. Worried that al-Azhar, in Egypt, would
introduce Sudanese students to Egyptian-style, anti-British nationalism, the authorities founded in 1912 a new Sudanese institute for Islamic education, called
al-Ma'had al-'Ilmi, in Omdurman. At the same time, at Gordon College in Khartoum (named in honor of General Charles Gordon and founded in 1902), British
authorities trained some elite Muslim boys for a future as moderate qadis (while
training others as accountants, schoolteachers, and the like). 44
World War I prompted the British to accelerate their efforts at co-opting elites.
When the Ottoman government of the Young Turks sided with Germany and
declared the war against the Entente powers to be a jihad, Britain feared that
Muslims throughout the British empire would rise up in waves of resistance. British fears were compounded when leaders of the Sanusiyya movement in Libya
staged an attack on Egypt's western flank in 1915-16 and when 'Ali Dinar, sultan
of the quasi-autonomous region of Darfur, sensed an opportunity and declared
jihad against the British in 1916 (prompting British authorities in Sudan to
invade, conquer, and annex Darfur in return). 45
Rather than confirming fears of widespread Muslim hostility, World War I provided an opportunity for Britain to cultivate new alliances with powerful Muslim
individuals and groups. Britain countered the Ottoman invocation of jihad, most
famously, by wooing Sharif Husayn of Mecca and orchestrating the Arab Revolt
from the Hijaz to Syria. In Sudan, the British made new overtures to Sayyid 'Abd
al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885-1959), the posthumous son of the Mahdi, who agreed
to declare support for Britain and its allies. In return, as a demonstration of their
goodwill, the British enabled Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman to build up large cotton plantations in the budding Gezira Scheme, with some officials calculating that by
making him rich, they might also make him complacent. Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman
used the opportunities wisely and benefited from the free farm labor of the Mahdist faithful who settled on his land and paid him alms in return for his baraka
(blessings). In fact, many of his faithful laborers were "Fellata," or Hausa-speaking
immigrants from northern Nigeria, who headed toward Sudan with the goal of
fulfilling millenarian expectations, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
finding economic opportunities. 46
By the time World War I ended, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was beginning
to sponsor early nationalist activities among young elite literati. One of his most
important ventures was funding Hadarat al-Sudan, a weekly newspaper started in
1919. This newspaper consciously supported "modernization" programs such as
the extension of piped water systems in Omdurman and the opening of new
schools, but it also took two approaches that reflected the evolution of a Mahdist
worldview. First, it attacked "un-Islamic" or superstitious customs and called for
their reform through education. Second, it supported the idea of Sudanese independence from both Britain and Egypt and became associated with the nationalist
slogan of "Sudan for the Sudanese" (Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin)Y
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Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman was charismatic, politically astute, and unflaggingly
hospitable to British guests; he also proved skillful at organizing the Ansar (followers of the Mahdi) behind him while insisting to the British that his intentions
were peaceful. By some accounts, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman transformed the Mahdist movement into a twentieth-century Sufi organization; certainly, the Ansar
48
contributed to a political and social landscape of Muslim sectarianism. Before
and after World War I, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman also voiced steadfast support for
the Anglo-Egyptian government in the face of a series of rural protests that
evoked the Mahdi. These protests were called Nabi 'Isa (Prophet Jesus) movements, because their leaders claimed to be 'Isa, or Jesus, returning after the Mahdi
but just before the Day of Judgment in the face of the "Antichrist" (al-Dajjal),
which they interpreted to mean the British government. In the words of one historian, "With the exception of the war years, hardly a year passed during the first
generation of Condominium rule without a Mahdist rising" or Nabi 'Isa move49
ment, and yet these rural uprisings failed to rally much support. These revolts,
which were the closest the British came to facing the popular jihad that they
feared, proved to be very local and easily suppressed.

Colonial Crusades?
Did jihadist discourses in modern Sudan inspire reciprocal colonial crusades? Bernard Lewis has argued that the late-nineteenth-century translation of European
history books into Arabic inspired new Muslim interest in the Crusades (c. 10961271) and thereby kindled an oppositional interest in jihads. 5° However, within
the specific local context of Sudan, it may be possible to argue the reverse, namely
that the assertion of Muslim holy war discourses within the Mahdist movement
encouraged the articulation of Christian equivalents, particularly within British
missionary circles.
Certainly, in the 1880s, around the time Britain occupied Egypt, British and, to
some extent, American evangelicals were beginning to place a strong emphasis on
the evangelization of Muslims worldwide, from Morocco to Southeast Asia. In this
period, British missionaries were adopting the kind of strong-arm rhetoric that mirrored the aggressive language of British imperialism, while in Britain itself, popular
imperialism and popular nationalism both maintained strong evangelical Protestant
dimensions. 51 In responses to the Mahdist revolution, missionaries adopted particularly strident tones and did so at a time when some were envisioning a contest for
souls between Islam and Christianity. By 1898, British and American missionaries
were cheering on the advance of Anglo-Egyptian forces into Mahdist Sudan, while
British missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) expressed a desire to
evangelize Muslims as a way of avenging the death of Charles Gordon many years
earlier. 52 In sum, although British colonial authorities never declared an official
crusade in the manner that the Mahdi declared a jihad, some Britons in Sudan,
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particularly missionaries of the CMS, freely invoked crusader discourses at the turn
of the century. They did so, in large part, to rally support among evangelical Christians in the home churches who provided missions with the bulk of their funding.
Perhaps it was an awareness of this militant Christian rhetoric that prompted
anthropologist Janice Boddy to argue that British policies in Sudan after 1898
amounted to a series of "colonial crusades." Boddy attributes a spirit of crusaderism not only to Christian missionaries but also to all British colonial functionaries
in Sudan and suggests that Christian agendas shaped the regime. She argues that
British efforts began with a crusade against Mahdism and evolved in the early
twentieth century into crusades against Sudanese customs, among them the
widespread practice of female genital cutting. Equating Christianity with civilization, British officials in Sudan fancied themselves as "knight-administrators,"
Boddy contends. They engaged in a struggle that amounted to a "clash of moralities" and deployed workers, such as government educators and midwives, as if
they were "secular missionaries." 53 Boddy's arguments are too sweeping, however,
insofar as they ignore the divergent views and mixed motives of British protagonists in Sudan.
In fact, high-ranking British colonial authorities, including Lord Cromer and
Sir Francis Wingate, regarded Christian missionaries as a nuisance and believed
that their evangelical agendas toward Muslims would stimulate popular resistance. Thus, they were often lukewarm or skeptical toward missionary claims,
even if deference to domestic British opinion inhibited them from airing their
views in public. 54 In the end, British officials after the Reconquest officially forbade
Christian missionaries to proselytize among Sudanese Muslims. They allowed
them to remain in northern towns with the understanding that they would either
cater to Christian expatriates (notably Copts, Greeks, and Ethiopians) or provide
social services to Muslims without trying to convert them. 55 CMS missionaries
resented this curtailment and did their best to evade it on the ground in Sudan.
Meanwhile, as early as 1910, at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh,
their supporters criticized British policies toward missionaries in Sudan and in
northern Nigeria. 56 CMS missionaries in the Nile Valley were also annoyed that
British officials approved only the teaching of Islam at Gordon College and that
they approved the use of "grammar books [that] deny the Christian faith." 57
However, British authorities such as Wingate had other plans for Christian
missionaries. They diverted them south, pointing to wide-open fields of endeavor,
and "urged a mission to the Pagans.'' 58 Through another neat maneuver, British
authorities managed to get missionaries to shoulder costs and responsibilities for
providing southern Sudanese peoples with some schooling. 5 9 At the same time, in
remote and thinly governed areas of southern Sudan, British officials were able to
use missionaries as proxies and relied on them for training southern Sudanese
men for employment as government clerks.
Missionaries were already describing southern Sudanese conversion to Christianity as a "mass movement" in 1932, with one CMS missionary recalling how at
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Yei, "Huge crowds surged round the car demanding books, baptism, confirmation
and more teachers.'' 60 Yet even in the south, British officials occasionally found
missionaries to be a nuisance. Around 1938, they deported one CMS missionary,
Richard Jones, who held very fiery revival meetings where he urged sinners and
backsliders to repent. British officials apparently deemed his style too inflammatory, but some southern Sudanese borrowed and adapted this 'Jones Revival"
style, with its ecstatic worship and faith healing, so that its impact persisted for
years afterward. 61
Relative to the total southern Sudanese population, Christian conversions appear to have been demographically minute during the colonial period. Nevertheless, the southern Sudanese products of mission schools became political organizers
when civil conflict broke out in 1955, after an army mutiny at Torit, months before
Britain staged its official ritual of decolonization by lowering the Union Jack in
Khartoum. Mission converts also functioned as the nucleus of a Christian community that expanded dramatically in the late twentieth century, leading some to
argue in the 1990s that Christianity in war-torn southern Sudan had indeed
62
become a mass movement and a vehicle for collective resistance.
During the Anglo-Egyptian period in northern Sudan, British missionaries had
persisted in evangelizing among Muslims, covertly and as opportunities arose,
notwithstanding the colonial government ban. By 1956, the CMS northern Sudan
mission claimed to have "won" just one convert from Islam in its half-century of
work in the region. 63 Yet its mission still made an impact, in social if not religious
terms, by providing models for the earliest formal girls' schools in northern
61
Sudan, including some schools that welcomed girls of slave origins. ·
Occasionally during the interwar period, rumors surfaced suggesting that missionaries may have converted orphan Muslim children to Christianity. Such
stories galvanized northern Sudanese Muslims in three ways. First, Sudanese
Muslims began by the 1920s to establish independent, community-supported
popular (ahliyya) schools as an alternative to Christian mission schools (since
British government schools were very limited in number and often restricted to
Muslim elites). Second, Sudanese Muslim women began to establish neighborhood "Needlework Homes," where girls could learn the art of homemaking before
getting married. One Sudanese writer also claimed that opposition to Christian
mission education prompted Muslim women to organize a public protest in 1946,
a protest that helped to inspire the foundation of the Sudanese Women's Union,
65
an important feminist and women's advocacy organization, in 1952. Third and
finally, such stories confirmed among some Muslim thinkers the belief that British colonial rule allowed and therefore abetted Christian missionary efforts to
evangelize among Muslims. 66
Here is where the discussion of "colonial crusades" arises again. Colonial policies and missionary activities sometimes stimulated Muslim resistance, with the
case of female genital cutting, and missionary- and government-supporte d efforts to eradicate it, offering a good example. Beginning in the late 1920s, British
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authorities had funded the establishment of a midwifery training college in
Omdurman under the leadership of two British sisters, Mabel and Gertrude Wolff.
These two women taught hygienic techniques and encouraged the modification of
an operation of genital cutting that was almost universally practiced among
northern Sudanese Muslim women at the time. This operation (sometimes called
"infibulation" in English) entailed excision of the clitoris and labia and restriction
of the vaginal opening, and it required surgical intervention at childbirth. 67
In 1946, the Anglo-Egyptian government, urged on by the wife of the British
governor-general, declared a ban on the operation of infibulation, known in Arabic as "Pharaonic circumcision" (al-khitan al-fzr'awni). 68 Muslim leaders, such as
Mahmud Muhammad Taha (who went on to found the organization known as the
Republican Brothers), organized an antigovernment rally to protest this ban on
an accepted practice. His resistance, which appears to have enjoyed considerable
popular support, landed him in prison. 69 Yet it is worth noting that prominent
Muslim scholars and leaders at the time issued opinions or published statements
supporting the ban and calling for the reform of female genital cutting as it was
usually practiced. In a newspaper statement, for example, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman
al-Mahdi declared that "Pharaonic circumcision is a shame and a degradation to
women apart from being contrary to the authenticated sunna [practice of the
Prophet Muhammad]." The mufti of Sudan published a statement that went further, suggesting that even the custom of clitoridectomy had dubious Islamic
70
grounds. Were Muslim leaders like these pressured by Britons into supporting
the ban, did they support the ban to curry British favor, or did they genuinely
believe in its aims as they related to the pursuit of Islamic practice? Historians
should not discount the possibility that these prominent Muslim critics of female
genital cutting genuinely supported the ban, since Sudan has furnished ample
evidence in its modern history to indicate the diversity of Muslim opinion.

The Lingering Discourse of Jihads and Crusades
When the conflict that later became known as the first civil war erupted with a
military mutiny at Torit in southern Sudan in 1955, northern Sudanese politicians in Khartoum looked upon missionaries as enemies who had undermined
national cohesion by propagating Christianity among southern "pagans." Thus, in
1957, the Khartoum government began to nationalize mission schools, and in
1964, it deported all foreign missionaries. A government memorandum issued at
the time described missionaries as an obstacle to national integration and accused
them of sheltering, supplying, or otherwise abetting southern "mutineers" and
"outlaws." 71 These measures forced the rapid indigenization of southern Sudanese
church leadership and confirmed the assumption among political analysts that
Muslim-Christian conflict would either become or remain a perennial theme in
modern Sudanese history.

Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from 1881 to the Present

275

This first civil war abated in 1972, with the signing of the Addis Ababa
Agreement, but it flared up again, more intensely, after 1983, when President
Ja'far Numayri proclaimed shari'a law. During the second civil war, as the post1983 conflict became known, Muslim ideology played an important role in the
central government 's discourses. To rally popular support and justify military
drafts among northern Muslims, Khartoum regimes portrayed the civil war as a
jihad and proclaimed that its war dead were martyrs. By the mid-1990s, the government had set up large murals of "martyrs" along major streets in the capital
and was inculcating militant Islam even in girls' elementary schools, where uni72
forms were made out of camouflage fabric.
jihad to be politically expedient in
found
After 1983, Khartoum politicians
other ways, too. Jihadist rhetoric enabled the regime to draw more support from
other Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, which helped the government with its
Islamization programs by offering money to construct mosques and Islamic
73
schools in remote and largely non-Muslim regions. More generally, northern
politicians gave lip service to shari'a law and Islamic values as a way of appealing
to Muslim populations who were otherwise disillusioned with the corruption,
71
mismanagem ent, and factional infighting of successive postcolonial regimes. ·
After its rise to power in the coup of 1989, the Bashir regime proved willing to
invoke jihad for internal wars, not only against assumed non-Muslims in the
south (where many Muslim families also lived, particularly in towns) but also
against Muslims elsewhere. The latter proved true in 1992, when government
forces bombed dissident Muslim communities in the Nuba Mountains of Kordofan and apparently sold thousands of survivors as slaves to the Arab tribal militias
that backed the regime. According to French analyst Gerard Prunier, the Bashir
regime's readiness to invoke jihad against Nuba Muslims presaged policies75that it
would later pursue in Darfur following the outbreak of war there in 2003.
By emphasizing the religious dimensions of civil conflicts, the Sudanese government tried to distract attention from the deep economic and political grievances that had been propelling these wars from the start. Many southerners, along
with other non-Arab Sudanese peoples (including Muslims from Darfur, the Nuba
Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills region), resented the way Arabic-speaking Muslims of the northern riverine Sudan had monopolized power and resources. They
were disgusted, in other words, with a history of underdevelopment and neglect in
the country's peripheries (a history that went back to the Anglo-Egyptian period).76 By 1983, many southerners opposed the regime's Jonglei Canal project,
which proposed to drain the south's White Nile tributaries in order to feed the
main Nile going into northern Sudan and Egypt. They feared the local environmental consequence s that the canal would have. Demand for Nile water, spurred
by the developmen t of agricultural industries and the Aswan Dam's hydroelectric
power plant, was growing, so that "hydropolitics" functioned as an important
issue for Sudanese-Eg yptian diplomacy. 77 Much the same later applied to "petropolitics," which centered on the oil that the Khartoum government began to
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extract from the southern Sudan (with help from Chinese, Malaysian, Canadian,
and other companies) in 1999. On top of this environmental and economic exploitation, the regime's attempts to foist Arabic and Islamic culture onto non-Arabs or
non-Muslims amounted to what some dissidents described as a new, internal
colonialism. 78
After 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M),
which was the main southern opposition force, called for secular government and
official recognition of Sudanese pluralism. The SPLA/M, which spread its organization into the Nuba Mountains and included both Muslim and Christian supporters (including Nuba Muslim commanders such as Yousif Kuwa Mekki)/ 9 did
not resort to crusader discourses even though Christianity was becoming increasingly influential as a cultural force among much of its rank and file. 80 Amid war
and displacement, international Christian organizations claimed to detect the
rapid expansion of Christianity among refugees and even among soldiers, citing,
for example, a sharp rise in the number of SPLA Christian chaplains by 2000. 81
One anthropologist ascribed the dramatic spread of Christianity to two things:
first, Christianity helped southern Sudanese to overcome ethnic divisions, which
had led to intense internecine fighting; and second, it offered them a "sturdy ideological opponent" against the official Islam of the Khartoum regimes. 82 Yet the
SPLNM retained both Muslim and Christian supporters, and this internal diversity reinforced the movement's commitment to cultural pluralism.
The so-called second civil war was brutal. In 1998, some fifteen years after this
bout of war had begun, the U.S. Committee for Refugees was estimating that some
2 million southern Sudanese people had died from war-related causes and more
than 80 percent of the southern population had experienced displacement. 83 However, this second civil war appeared to end in 2005, when the government of Sudan
(representing the Bashir regime in Khartoum) and the SPLM (representing southern interests) met in Naivasha, Kenya, to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). After so many years of strife, southern Sudanese people-both in Sudan
and in the diaspora-drew hope from the CPA's claim that following a transitional
period of government partnership, southerners would have the chance to vote in
a referendum on national unity in 2011.
In 2003, a new Sudanese civil war broke out in the western Sudanese region of
Darfur, pitting "rebels" and settled civilian populations on the one hand against
government forces and nomadic Arab militias on the other. By 2005, at the peak of
the violence against Darfurian civilians, some analysts were suggesting that the
westward shift of war toward Darfur was no accident, insofar as the Khartoum
regime was using war as a machine for survival in the aftermath of signing the CPA
with southerners. Regardless, the war in Darfur illustrated that peace for southern
Sudan was and could only be a partial resolution of Sudan's civil conflicts, since
popular grievances extended into the Muslim-majority regions of the country's
eastern and western peripheries. The Darfur war also illustrated the limits of using
religion-and in this case, the ostensible Islamic ideology of the Bashir regime-as
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an explanatory device for political behavior. Indeed, Sudanese and non-Sudanese
analysts alike agreed with reference to the Darfur war that notions of race and
ethnicity (involving Arab rather than Islamic ideology) were intensifying and complicating the conflict. 8·1

Conclusion
In 1974, the Sudanese folklorist Qurashi Muhammad Hasan argued that praise
poetry-which he called the "jihad of the pen" -had been more important to the
success of the Mahdist revolution than the "jihad of the sword" involving soldiers
in combat. Yet historians of Sudan have remembered the "sword fights" more
than the "pen fights," by emphasizing the importance of battles such as the "Fall
of Khartoum" in 1885, the Battle of Karari (Omdurman) in 1898, or the Torit
Mutiny in 1955 (the event that by many accounts set off the "first" Sudanese civil
war). Fewer have examined the discursive evidence of conflict, found in proclamations, panegyrics, memoranda, personal letters, memoirs, newspaper articlesthe list goes on and on. Such discursive evidence can tell us how, amid the claims
for jihads and crusades, Muslims and Christians in Sudan have mobilized supporters, attacked opponents, and justified proposals for change, even while
defining themselves.
Fulfilling provisions that the CPA of 2005 had set out, southern Sudanese
people had the opportunity to vote in a referendum on national unity that occurred in January 2011. The referendum yielded clear and dramatic results: nearly
99 percent supported southern secession. Secession occurred in July 2011, and a
new country, the Republic of South Sudan, was born. With South Sudan now a
state apart from Sudan, possible conflicts still loom large, conflicts involving natural resources (oil and water) and the treatment of religious minorities (Christians in Sudan and Muslims in South Sudan). However-to a degree much greater
than in earlier periods of Sudanese history-external powers are likely to intervene in these disputes for the sake of advancing their own diverse interests. These
external powers will include Egypt, China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kenya,
and Uganda. 85 As this chapter's study of Sudanese history suggests, for better or
worse, jihadist or crusader discourses may well continue to provide a vehicle and
a flexible vocabulary for advancing agendas, claims to power, and calls for change.
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